Finance and economics
財經版塊
Putin’s problem
普京的問題
What does the rouble’s collapse mean for Russia’s ability to wage war?
盧布暴跌對俄羅斯發動戰爭的能力意味著什么?
On August 14th Russia’s rouble slipped past the value of 100 to the American dollar, meaning it was worth less than a solitary cent—and was the cheapest it had been since the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine.
8月14日,俄羅斯盧布匯率跌破了1美元兌100盧布的水平,這意味著盧布的價值還不到1美分,也是俄烏戰爭爆發后的最低水平。
The currency is one of the world’s worst performers this year, outdone only by perennially troublesome peers like the Argentine peso, Venezuelan bolivar and Turkish lira.
盧布是今年全球表現最差的貨幣之一,僅次于阿根廷比索、委內瑞拉玻利瓦爾和土耳其里拉等長期深陷麻煩的貨幣。
The next day Russian monetary policymakers intervened, scrambling to respond to events for the first time since early in the war.
第二天,俄羅斯貨幣政策制定者出手干預,自戰爭之初以來首次爭先恐后地對事件做出回應。
The Bank of Russia raised interest rates by 3.5 percentage points, to 12%.
俄羅斯央行將利率上調3.5個百分點,至12%。
Although the rouble rose a little on the news, it is still, at 96 to the dollar, far cheaper than its level of 60 or so this time last year.
盡管盧布在這一消息傳出后略有上漲,但目前1美元兌96盧布的匯率仍遠低于去年這個時候1美元兌60盧布的水平。
Rate rises are unlikely to stem the currency’s decline soon, with consequences for Vladimir Putin’s ability to wage war.
加息不太可能很快阻止盧布的下跌,這將影響弗拉基米爾·普京發動戰爭的能力。
Currency collapses are often prompted by nervous international investors or fleeing domestic capital.
貨幣崩盤往往是由緊張的國際投資者或國內資本外逃引發的。
Yet trading in the rouble, especially against the dollar, remains thin.
然而,盧布的交易,尤其是對美元的交易,仍然不多。
Sanctions and capital controls have left Russia isolated.
制裁和資本管制讓俄羅斯變得孤立。
Instead of reflecting the aggregated opinions of speculators, the rouble swings according to the textbook economic model, reflecting the relative strength of exports (which earn foreign currency) and imports (which must be paid for with these earnings).
盧布沒有反映出投機者的總體態度,而是按照教科書上的經濟模型進行波動,反映了出口(賺取外匯)和進口(必須用這些外匯支付)的相對強弱。
Since the G7 imposed a $60 price cap on Russian oil in December, the value of exports has slumped.
自去年12月七國集團對俄羅斯石油實施60美元的價格上限以來,俄羅斯的出口額大幅下降。
Russia’s earnings were 15% lower in dollar terms from January to July than during the same period last year, a fact not entirely explained by a lower global oil price.
以美元計算,俄羅斯今年1月至7月的收入比去年同期下降了15%,這一事實并不能完全用全球油價下跌來解釋。
Meanwhile, imports have surged as the government prosecutes its war, and buys the goods to do so.
與此同時,隨著政府繼續進行戰爭,并為此購買商品,進口額激增。
In the first seven months of the year Russia’s current-account surplus, a measure of how much more foreign currency the country receives than spends, fell by 86%, to $25bn.
今年前七個月,俄羅斯的經常賬戶盈余下降了86%,降至250億美元。經常賬戶盈余是衡量一國外匯收入超過支出多少的一個指標。
On the one hand, this suggests the oil-price cap is having some impact.
一方面,這表明石油價格上限在產生一些影響。
Attempts to dodge the policy are not making up for being forced to sell oil at a discount.
試圖規避這一政策并不能彌補被迫折價出售石油帶來的損失。
On the other hand, it suggests Russia is finding ways to import goods.
另一方面,這表明俄羅斯正在尋找進口商品的方法。
German exports to Russia’s friendlier neighbours, for instance, have shot up suspiciously.
例如,德國對俄羅斯更友好的鄰國的出口額出現了蹊蹺的大幅增長。
A cheap currency raises the rouble value of the government’s oil revenues, but it also raises the cost of the imports.
廉價貨幣提高了政府出口石油收入的盧布價值,但也提高了進口成本。
In June Andrei Belousov, Russia’s deputy prime minister, said the value at the time, of 80-90 roubles a dollar, was best for the country.
6月,俄羅斯副總理安德烈·別洛烏索夫表示,當時1美元兌80-90盧布的匯率對俄羅斯來說是最好的。
When the rouble was far stronger last year, the Russian government was happy to use it as evidence Western sanctions were failing.
去年盧布走強時,俄羅斯政府欣然將其作為西方制裁失敗的證據。
That confidence has now gone.
這種信心現在已經消失了。
On August 14th Maxim Oreshkin, an adviser to Mr Putin, wrote a column stressing the need for a strong rouble and blaming its collapse on the central bank.
8月14日,普京的顧問馬克西姆·奧雷什金寫了一篇專欄文章,強調盧布走強的必要性,并將盧布的崩潰歸咎于中央銀行。
The emergency rate rise helped the rouble only a little.
緊急加息對盧布的幫助微乎其微。
Russia’s isolation means higher interest rates are unlikely to tempt “hot money” (speculative funds seeking short-term returns).
俄羅斯的孤立地位意味著,較高的利率不太可能吸引“熱錢”(尋求短期回報的投機性資金)。
The focus may now turn to the domestic capital that is at risk of fleeing.
焦點現在可能轉向有外逃風險的國內資本。
Strengthening capital controls could stanch the flow, but would take time to have an impact.
加強資本管制可能會遏制資本流動,但需要時間才能產生效果。
As this piece was published, the government was reportedly due to meet to decide whether to force exporters to sell foreign-currency earnings.
本文發表時,據報道,俄羅斯政府將召開會議,決定是否強制出口商出售外匯收入。
Direct intervention in currency markets is another option.
直接干預外匯市場是另一種選擇。
The central bank has scaled back purchases of foreign currency.
央行已經縮減了外幣購買量。
Under a budgetary rule, Russia used to buy other currencies in exchange for roubles if it had a surplus of oil and gas revenue, in order to build up reserves.
根據一項預算規定,俄羅斯過去如果有石油和天然氣收入盈余,就會購買其他貨幣來換取盧布,以建立儲備。
On August 9th this rule was abandoned.
8月9日,這一規定被廢除。
According to official figures, the country had foreign-currency reserves of $587bn at the start of August, suggesting the central bank has the firepower to prop up the rouble.
官方數據顯示,截至8月初,俄羅斯擁有5870億美元的外匯儲備,這表明俄羅斯央行擁有支撐盧布的足夠火力。
The problem is that some $300bn of these reserves are frozen by the West.
問題是,其中約3000億美元的外匯儲備已被西方凍結。
Unless the government can secure more oil revenue, it faces a choice.
除非俄羅斯政府能從石油獲得更多的外匯收入,否則它將面臨一個選擇。
The state could cut back on spending, including on its armed forces, in order to reduce imports.
國家可以削減開支,包括軍隊開支,以減少進口。
Alternatively, the civilian economy will take the pain.
或者讓民間經濟承擔痛苦。
Rising inflation and higher interest rates will weaken the purchasing power of ordinary Russians, forcing them to buy fewer foreign goods.
不斷上升的通脹和更高的利率將削弱普通俄羅斯人的購買力,迫使他們減少購買外國商品。
Thus the fate of Russia’s economy will not be decided by the judgments of international financiers but by the depths of Mr Putin’s aggression.
因此俄羅斯經濟的命運將不會由國際金融家的判斷決定,而將由普京的戰爭強度決定。
It is a far more unhappy situation in which to be trapped.
這是一種更加令人不快的困境。